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HELLER AND THE PERILS OF COMPROMISE 
by 
Mark Tushnet
∗ 
Heller’s compromise was to invalidate one quite restrictive gun regulation 
while asserting that others are presumptively constitutional. The Court’s 
opinion does not clearly explicate the methods courts are to use in analyzing 
gun regulations, and the analogies it draws between the First and the Second 
Amendments leave the methodological question open. By sketching how First 
Amendment methods might be applied to Second Amendment problems, this 
Essay suggests that the revolution in Second Amendment jurisprudence 
Heller wrought may be less substantial than gun-rights proponents hope. 
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I.  HELLER’S COMPROMISE 
We now know that the Second Amendment guarantees us the right 
to keep handguns in our homes for purposes of self-defense. What else 
the Second Amendment guarantees is unclear. The Court offered a “non-
exhaustive” list of regulations that, it said, its opinion “should [not] be 
taken to cast doubt on,” including:  
longstanding prohibitions [such as those] on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or [on] laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
1  
Nor, according to the Court, did anything in the “analysis suggest the 
invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”
2 
 
∗ William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Vicki 
Jackson and Mike Seidman for the helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
Essay. 
1 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 & n.26 (2008). 
2 Id. at 2820. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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Exactly why these regulations are “presumptively lawful”
3 is obscure, as is 
what might be sufficient to overcome the presumption. 
The reason is that these components of Heller are transparent add-
ons. They were clearly tacked on to the opinion to secure a fifth vote 
(presumably Justice Anthony Kennedy’s). But compromises run the risk 
of undermining whatever principle the Court's conclusion rests on. 
Proponents of gun rights should temper their celebrations by keeping 
the lesson of the so-called Federalism Revolution of the 1990s in mind: as 
noted in the title of an article on the Court’s federalism cases co-
authored by two such proponents, what if they held a revolution and 
nobody came?
4 
The Heller revolution may not be quite as limited as the Federalism 
Revolution has been. The guarantee of gun possession in the home 
might be consequential. It might deter assaults on law-abiding 
homeowners,
5 and it might reduce the incidence of robberies of 
occupied homes, as gun-rights proponents sometimes suggest. It might 
also lead to the deaths of some Americans, both law-abiding and 
otherwise, as gun-control proponents sometimes suggest.
6 And, as Glenn 
Reynolds and Brannon Denning point out, gun-rights proponents are 
likely to be significantly more aggressive in supporting litigation 
challenging gun regulations than were the purported beneficiaries of the 
Federalism (and Takings) Revolutions.
7 But, because complete bans on 
gun possession in the home like that in the District of Columbia are quite 
rare, Heller’s effects on crime, violence, and gun violence are likely to be 
small either way. Indeed, I think it worth noting my view, based on a 
survey of the relevant policy literature, that the best estimate one can give 
for the effects of any gun policy likely to emerge from the U.S. political 
process—whether it be a gun-rights or a gun-control policy—is close to 
zero. 
Of course compromises can unravel in either direction,
8 and Heller 
might portend quite robust restrictions on gun regulations. The track 
 
3 Id. at 2817 n.26. 
4 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or 
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 369 (2000). 
5 I use the term “homeowners” as a short-hand that includes tenants in their 
rented residences. 
6 The latter point echoes a concern Justice Antonin Scalia expressed in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The 
decision] will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. That consequence 
would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a time-honored legal principle vital to our 
constitutional Republic.”). The reference to necessity is presumably a description of 
the Second Amendment. 
7 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2008). 
8 I discuss the possibility of an unraveling in the direction of a robust Second 
Amendment below. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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record of recent conservative constitutional “revolutions” is not 
encouraging though, from the perspective of gun-rights proponents.
9 
II.  THE ANALOGY TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Heller’s compromises are perhaps even more interesting because they 
are compromises with only legal effects, not policy ones.
10 And, as I have 
suggested, even those legal effects might be small, precisely because Heller 
is a compromise. Heller might be a failed revolution (from gun-rights 
proponents’ point of view) because the Court acknowledges that “Like 
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.”
11 The opinion also gives examples, as noted above, of 
presumptively lawful limits on the Second Amendment right.
12 But 
Heller’s compromise includes a deep ambivalence, amounting perhaps to 
a contradiction, about how we are to analyze the constitutionality of 
limitations on the Second Amendment right. Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion is rife with an absolutist rhetoric about the methods of 
constitutional interpretation, but the compromises embedded in the 
opinion are inconsistent with that rhetoric. And the absolutist rhetoric is 
mistaken: For a number of reasons the interest-balancing that Justice 
Scalia derides as inconsistent with proper interpretive method is 
inevitable, even within the methodological approach Justice Scalia 
endorses. 
Justice Stephen Breyer in dissent argued for “an interest-balancing 
inquiry” in which the Court would ask “whether the statute burdens a 
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the 
statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”
13 
Justice Scalia responded that this misunderstood the structure of the 
protection of rights in our Constitution. He compared the Second 
Amendment with the First.
14 Yet, the structure of First Amendment 
analysis, in virtually every incarnation (save perhaps one), utilizes the 
kind of interest-balancing inquiry that Justice Scalia asserted was 
 
9 See also Reynolds & Denning, supra note 7, at 2038 (reaching a similar 
conclusion). 
10 Had the dissenters in Heller prevailed, the costs of defending gun-control 
regulations in litigation would have decreased dramatically, but the political costs of 
enacting new regulations and avoiding the repeal of old ones would (as a result, I 
think) have also increased. With Heller on the books, the litigating costs will increase, 
but the political ones might decrease because Heller takes out of the domain of 
political argument the slippery-slope—“If you let them enact this one, it’s only a step 
toward confiscation of your weapons”—that has been quite effective in the politics of 
gun policy. 
11 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008). 
12 Id. at 2816–17. 
13 Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
14 Id.  at 2799. The comparison is with the First Amendment’s free speech 
guarantee and not its religion clauses, and I confine my analysis accordingly. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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inappropriate for the Second, precisely for the purpose of identifying 
which regulations of speech are constitutionally permissible. 
I think exposition of the problems with Heller’s compromises is best 
begun by describing several modes of First Amendment analysis and then 
continued by describing the places in Justice Scalia’s opinion that use 
analogues to each mode. The thing to keep in mind is that each mode of 
First Amendment analysis ends up incorporating some form of interest-
balancing. 
The first mode of First Amendment analysis is one in which activities 
covered by the First Amendment are sharply distinguished from those 
not so covered. Call this the “inside-outside” model: Regulations of 
speech “inside” the First Amendment are presumptively unconstitutional, 
while regulations of forms of expression outside the First Amendment 
receive no special First Amendment scrutiny. So, to use the example 
Justice Scalia uses in Heller, the First Amendment covers “the expression 
of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views,” but does not cover 
obscenity and libel.
15 How do we determine what categories of speech are 
outside the First Amendment? For reasons not worth developing here, 
the answer cannot be, “By examining the original understanding of the 
words ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’”
16 Rather, we determine the 
boundaries between the inside and the outside by considering the 
purposes the First Amendment serves and whether the regulation at issue 
is inconsistent with those purposes.
17 On standard views, that 
determination involves some form of interest-balancing.
18 
 
15 Id. at 2821. 
16 See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008), 
for a brief discussion of this proposition. 
17 This explains the Court’s holding, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that a viewpoint-based regulation of 
fighting words, ordinarily a category of expression described as outside the First 
Amendment, is constitutionally impermissible: Eliminating viewpoint as a basis for 
regulating expression is one of the First Amendment’s primary purposes. 
18 Justice Scalia repeatedly suggests that a historical rather than an interest-
balancing approach will work with respect to the Second Amendment, but this seems 
to me quite unlikely. His suggestions occur in connection with his enumeration of 
presumptively constitutional regulations. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (“Justice 
Breyer chides us for .  .  . not providing extensive historical justification for those 
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible.” (emphasis added)). The 
thought is that we can explain the presumptive constitutionality of the regulations by 
identifying regulations in place in 1791 that were not then understood to be 
incompatible with the right to keep and bear arms. So, for example, regulations of 
“dangerous and unusual weapons” were acceptable to the framing generation. See id. 
at 2817. We can use this fact, Justice Scalia suggests, to identify types of weapons that 
can be regulated today. The process is something like this: What were the 
characteristics of the weapons then understood to be unusual and dangerous, and 
what weapons today have those characteristics? The difficulty with this mode of 
analysis is that we are quite likely to have a relatively small data base from the past of 
permissible regulations—thinner with respect to some than with respect to others, of 
course. And the smaller the base, the harder it will be to identify characteristics—in 
any way that is not transparently the product of contemporary rather than framing-era LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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A second mode of First Amendment analysis is a slight extension of 
the “inside-outside” model. Here there are numerous categories of 
expressive activities, some close to the heart of the First Amendment’s 
purposes, some not as close, and some quite remote. Call this the “onion-
layer” model, in which categories of speech receive different degrees of 
protection—“standards of scrutiny,” as Justice Scalia uses the term
19 in 
Heller—depending on how close to the First Amendment’s heart they are. 
In this model, interest-balancing occurs twice: once in determining which 
categories of speech receive which level of scrutiny, and then, with the 
exception of speech at the First Amendment’s core, in determining 
whether the regulation at issue is constitutionally permissible. 
A third mode of First Amendment analysis deals with what used to be 
called “time, place, and manner” regulations and are now called content-
neutral regulations. Here interest-balancing is all there is: A court 
considering the constitutionality of a “time, place, and manner” 
regulation directly balances the impairment of expression against the 
degree to which the regulation accomplishes the government’s 
permissible purposes. 
III.  DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE LIMITS ON SECOND 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Return now to the Second Amendment. 
In the “inside-outside” model of the First Amendment there are core 
protections and categorical exclusions—actually, sharp boundaries 
separating what is protected from what is not. So too, Justice Scalia 
suggests, with the Second Amendment. The presumptively lawful 
regulations he lists lie outside the Second Amendment’s scope and are 
constitutional if rational.
20 
The prohibitions on carrying weapons in “sensitive places” fit into 
this structure easily enough. The Second Amendment’s core protection is 
of gun ownership for purposes of “defense of hearth and home.”
21 
Schools and government buildings are not anyone’s home and so fall 
 
judgments—that we are going to then analogize to the characteristics found in 
today’s circumstances. Alternatively, what we identify as the relevant characteristics of 
the framing-era regulations will be the product of our contemporary concerns rather 
than characteristics that those in the founding generation understood to be the ones 
that made regulation permissible. (Or, even more likely, people in the founding 
generation would not have had any common understanding about the characteristics 
that explain why the regulations that all agreed were permissible were consistent with 
the right to keep and bear arms.) These are general difficulties with the originalist 
project as implemented in Heller. For a broader discussion of such difficulties, see 
Tushnet, supra note 16. 
19 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
20 For the rationality requirement, see id. at 2817–18 n.27 (referring to “the 
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws”). 
21 Id. at 2821. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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categorically outside the Second Amendment’s scope.
22 The 
permissibility of banning gun possession by felons is harder to 
understand, given this structure of analysis. Felons who have served their 
sentences are no less susceptible to home invasions and assaults than are 
law-abiding people (perhaps even m
This problem leads to a more general one: how are we to determine 
the boundaries separating the protected constitutional right from the 
unprotected area? It should be clear that the originalist approach taken 
by the Court is unhelpful here: Seeking the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment might lead us to an understanding of what is inside 
the boundary—the core or heart of the Second Amendment and some 
“nearby” rights—but not where the boundary is.
23 The best candidate for 
a method of locating the boundary is what in the First Amendment 
context is called categorical balancing, where it is the usual explanation 
for the exclusions to which Justice Scalia referred. As noted briefly above, 
a court engaging in categorical balancing identifies the purposes served 
by the protection of the constitutional right at the core and asks whether 
the general type of regulation at issue is sufficiently related to those 
purposes as to warrant the same strong presumption against 
constitutionality, or alternatively, whether the regulation is so far 
removed from the right’s core purposes that it is constitutionally 
permissible.
24 Importantly, regulation of subjects outside the boundary 
need not have no adverse effects on the subject inside the boundary; 
rather, courts conclude that those adverse effects or burdens are thought 
 
22 One might wonder about the status of university dormitories. Further, one can 
read passages in the Court’s opinion to suggest that the Second Amendment 
guarantees a right to use weapons in self-defense whether in the home or not. Then, 
however, the presumptive constitutionality of bans on guns in sensitive places 
becomes either quite puzzling or strongly conditioned on the definition of the 
category “sensitive places.” As to the first, obviously there is no difference between the 
home and the outdoors when one is threatened with assault: If you have a free-
standing right to use weapons in self-defense, where the assault occurs is 
happenstance. As to the second: Again, if you have a free-standing right to use 
weapons in self-defense in some places outside the home but not others, how can we 
distinguish between courthouses and schools, or indeed between courthouses and 
the streets? Given the Court’s divisions on figuring out the original understanding of 
the Second Amendment with respect to gun possession in the home, it seems to me 
extremely implausible that such distinctions might emerge from further examination 
of original understanding. Rather, some sort of interest-balancing seems inevitable. 
23 As I understand it, proponents of the kind of originalism used in Heller refer to 
the question noted in the text as one that leads courts to do what they call 
constitutional construction rather than constitutional interpretation. (I am 
insufficiently familiar with that kind of originalism to be as confident as I would like 
to be about the foregoing assertion.) 
24 For example, on this account obscenity and fighting words are categorically 
excluded from First Amendment protection because regulation of obscenity and 
fighting words does not pose the risks of suppression of political and other “high 
value” speech that are the central concern of that Amendment. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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justified by the policy goals the government seeks to achieve through the 
regulation.
25 
Applied to the Second Amendment and the examples Justice Scalia 
offers of presumptively constitutional regulations, categorical balancing 
might lead to an analysis along the following lines: True, felons have no 
smaller need for guns to defend themselves in the home than anyone 
else, but the fact that they committed a felony in the past indicates that 
they are less likely to abide by clearly permissible restrictions on gun use, 
for example in committing other crimes. Balancing the self-defense 
interest against the public-protection interest, we exclude felons from the 
Second Amendment’s protection.
26 
Elsewhere, though, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests the “onion 
model” analytic structure. The gun regulation at issue in Heller, the 
opinion says, would fail “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we 
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”
27 In general, a 
“standards of scrutiny” approach is different from one seeking to define 
the boundaries of a protected right. Under the latter approach, all one 
asks is whether a protected right is burdened: If it is, regulation is 
impermissible, and if it is not, regulation is permissible if rational.
28 
Under a “standards of scrutiny” approach, one asks, “Given that a 
protected right is burdened by this regulation, and given the character of 
that right, how strong a justification does the government need to have to 
impose this kind of burden?” Roughly speaking, where the right is 
fundamental and is burdened more than trivially, the regulation receives 
strict scrutiny, and the government must provide very good reasons 
(“compelling” ones, in the doctrinal jargon) for imposing the burden 
and must show that the regulation does quite a good job of achieving the 
government’s purposes (the regulation is “narrowly tailored”). The 
 
25 The classic formulation in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), 
makes this clear: “It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality” (emphasis added). Id. at 572. 
26 Two observations about this analysis: (1) It is not clear why the relevant 
category is felons rather than, for example, felons who have committed violent crimes (or 
even felons who have committed crimes using guns). The incremental risk to the public 
from gun ownership by white-collar criminals seems to me rather small. (2) If 
categorical balancing explains the presumptively lawful limitations on gun possession 
and ownership, the force of Justice Scalia’s criticism of Justice Breyer’s approach is 
markedly diminished, for as I discuss in this Essay, Justice Breyer is best taken as 
advocating not case-by-case balancing as Justice Scalia asserted, but precisely a form of 
categorical balancing. I examine some additional aspects of this understanding of 
Justice Breyer’s approach in a companion essay, Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Critique 
of Judgment, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
27 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008). 
28 This approach requires some attention to the identification of what counts as a 
burden, a problem familiar in the constitutional law of free exercise of religion. For a 
discussion, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989). LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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doctrinal formulations of other standards of scrutiny vary. The core 
problem involves an important but not quite fundamental right, which is 
burdened to some significant (although perhaps not “substantial”) 
degree. Here the government has to have pretty good reasons for its 
regulation, although the reasons do not have to be “compelling,” and the 
regulation has to do a decent although not “almost perfect” job of 
achieving its goals. 
Oddly, but almost certainly because of the opinion’s compromises, 
Justice Scalia asserts that the ban on handgun possession in the home 
would not survive “any of the standards of scrutiny” applied to 
enumerated rights but does not explain why. The next paragraph of the 
opinion begins, “Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to 
the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban,” and the succeeding 
one describes the “many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for 
home defense.”
29 This establishes, I suppose, that the burden on the 
right is substantial or even really, really big. That might be sufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation in the “inside-outside” model. 
But, as I have observed, a “standards of scrutiny” approach requires 
two additional steps, identifying of the government’s purposes in 
regulating and determining the aptness of the regulation to those 
purposes. And, as far as I can tell, there is nothing in the opinion taking 
either of those steps. In what at first seems to be the final sentence of the 
“standards of scrutiny” analysis, Justice Scalia writes, “handguns are the 
most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, 
and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”
30 That conclusion is 
fine for a boundary-determining analysis, but is quite inadequate for the 
“standards of scrutiny” analysis in which it appears to be embedded. This 
is one point where Heller’s compromises generate a methodological 
tension if not more than that. 
Compromises being what they are, Justice Scalia wanders back to the 
boundary-determining or “inside-outside” analysis: “The very 
enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government . . . the 
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth 
insisting upon.”
31 Note that “case-by-case” does the heavy lifting here. 
And the term is perhaps inapt. A true “case-by-case” analysis would ask, 
for example: Given the circumstances in which Dick Heller (the 
respondent asserting a right to keep a handgun in his home) found 
himself, was the government justified in barring him from keeping a 
handgun in his home? Did he live in a particularly high-crime 
neighborhood, had he been the victim of home invasions in the past, 
 
29 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 2821. LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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how well-trained was he in the use of handguns?
32 Justice Breyer asked 
none of those questions. Rather, he asked what the District of Columbia’s 
crime rate was, how prevalent unlawful uses of guns was, and the like. His 
balancing approach was “regulation-by-regulation,” 
33
The more accurate term “regulation-by-regulation” basis, though, 
brings out the degree to which Justice Scalia’s “jurisprudential” foray 
ends in confusion.
34 Start with Justice Scalia’s discussion of which weapons 
are—to use boundary-defining language—within the scope of the Second 
Amendment. These are weapons “in common use at the time.”
35 But, 
Justice Scalia does not mean that the Second Amendment protects only 
the possession of muskets and old-fashioned pistols. Rather, “in common 
use at the time” means “weapons . . . typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes.”
36 Why? The answer must be based in some 
sort of policy analysis and balancing, perhaps that contemporary 
handguns are “enough like” muskets and pistols with respect to their 
ability to protect against assaults in the home and to their susceptibility to 
dangerous misuse, where the metrics of ability-to-protect and misuse take 
contemporary circumstances into account. But that is precisely the kind 
of analysis called for by regulation-by-regulation balancing.
37 
A similar analysis explains why “the historical tradition of prohibiting 
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” apparently supports 
bans on possession of M-16 rifles.
38 Why do M-16s fall within the category 
of “dangerous and unusual weapons”? Again, the answer, at least as to 
dangerousness, has to come from some policy analysis and balancing: 
perhaps, for example, dangerous weapons are those that, while 
admittedly more effective in providing defense against assaults, pose 
significantly higher risks of harm when misused, and their greater 
effectiveness is outweighed by the higher risk. 
 
32 For an example of a true “case-by-case” analysis, see State v. Hamdan, 665 
N.W.2d 785 (Wis. 2003), discussed in MARK  TUSHNET,  OUT OF RANGE:  WHY THE 
CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 123–24 (2007). 
33 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
34 For the term “jurisprudential,” see Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. I must note that 
what follows is hardly novel, except in its application of an analysis well-developed in 
the First Amendment literature to the Second Amendment. 
35 Id. at 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
36 Id. at 2816. Note that this formulation makes sense only because the regulation 
at issue was, as noted, unusual in its coverage. Residents of the District of Columbia 
could not lawfully possess handguns, but people living elsewhere could. Does this 
imply that a nationwide ban on handgun possession would not violate the Second 
Amendment because then handguns could not be possessed by law-abiding citizens? 
37 To see the point, consider that there is no doubt whatsoever that the Court 
would have found the District of Columbia’s regulation unconstitutional even had it 
included an exception allowing the possession of immediately operable pistols and 
muskets. 
38 Id. at 2817. Perhaps to niggle: Does a historical tradition prohibiting “carrying” 
dangerous and unusual weapons encompass a ban on possessing such weapons in the 
home? LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
428  LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 13:2 
                                                        
Note the analytic structure here. Some sort of originalism identifies 
the boundaries of the protected right in general terms, but some sort of 
policy-based balancing tells us whether a particular regulation falls inside 
or outside those boundaries. Justice Breyer’s approach has the same 
structure, with only one difference: He does the policy-balancing first, 
and uses its result to identify the boundaries of the protected right. This 
may look like a significant difference: The Court’s opinion is originalist 
in identifying the protected rights and policy-based only in identifying 
which contemporary regulations fall within and outside the Second 
Amendment’s boundaries, while Justice Breyer’s is, at its heart, only 
policy-based. Yet appearances are misleading, because all the serious 
work is done at the boundaries. Justice Breyer’s opinion, for example, 
emphasizes how important it is to his analysis that the handgun ban 
applies only in an urban area with an especially high crime rate.
39 As an 
analytic matter, there is no difference between extending the Second 
Amendment’s protection from muskets and pistols to contemporary 
handguns and restricting its scope to geographic areas like those in the 
United States of 1791—thinly populated, with rates of crime and assault 
low relative to contemporary figures. 
In short, determining the actual boundaries of the Second 
Amendment—figuring out what falls within the protected core and what 
is in the unprotected area beyond—is a process that involves categorical 
or statute-by-statute balancing of the policies underlying the 
constitutional guarantee. Justice Scalia concludes that the Second 
Amendment “is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people.”
40 
As stated, true enough, but also as stated, entirely unhelpful in 
determining where the Amendment’s boundaries lie. Boundary-
determination by means of categorical balancing and regulation-by-
regulation balancing are the same thing. Despite the tone of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, he is on the same methodological page as Justice Breyer, 
though he cannot admit the fact. 
Next, consider the analogy to “time, place, and manner” regulations. 
Such regulations prohibit or place conditions on the exercise of speech 
undoubtedly protected against complete prohibition by the First 
Amendment. So, for example, Kovacs v. Cooper upheld a ban on using 
sound trucks in residential neighborhoods, even when the sound trucks 
were used to amplify a political candidate’s message.
41 The standard for 
evaluating time, place, and manner regulations is that they must be 
reasonable, and “justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, .  .  . [be] narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and . . .  leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”
42 And, more specifically:  
 
39 See, id. at 2854–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 2821. 
41 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
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What our decisions require is a ‘“fit” between the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends’—a fit that is 
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition, but one whose scope is “in 
proportion to the interest served,” that employs not necessarily the 
least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other contexts 
discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental 
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be 
employed.
43 
As the Court has emphasized, this requires more than mere 
rationality,
44 but it also clearly requires some sort of balancing (and 
deference to legislative judgment). 
I note, and in a moment will return to, the point that the analogy 
Justice Scalia draws between the First and the Second Amendments need 
not imply that specific doctrinal formulations developed to deal with First 
Amendment questions can transfer directly to the Second Amendment. 
Before doing so, though, I think two matters deserve some attention. The 
first is again methodological. The Court’s treatment of “time, place, and 
manner” regulations shows that balancing of some sort is not foreign to 
the evaluation of regulations of constitutionally protected activities.
45 
Second, to the extent that a direct analogy to “time, place, and 
manner” regulations is appropriate, most—I would say almost all—
regulations of weapons are indeed such regulations. Bans on carrying 
weapons in specific areas, for example, are clearly “place” regulations. 
Bans on possessing “dangerous and unusual weapons” are easily 
described as “manner” regulations. Were the courts to adopt the tests 
used for “time, place, and manner” regulations to deal with Second 
Amendment questions, the central questions would be whether the 
regulations were narrowly tailored to advance the interests the 
government seeks to advance and whether they allowed ample alternative 
methods of exercising the right protected by the Second Amendment, 
subject to some degree of judicial deference to legislative judgment.
46 
Notably, the District of Columbia regulation might be unconstitutional 
under this formulation: The right protected is a right to use weapons in 
self-defense while in one’s home,
47 and the handgun ban did not leave 
 
43 Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (internal citations omitted). 
44 See, e.g., id. at 480–81 (“the test we have described is . . . far different . . . from 
the ‘rational basis’ test . . . . Here we require the government goal to be substantial, 
and the cost to be carefully calculated.”). 
45 Of course, it might be appropriate only when something like a “time, place, 
and manner” regulation is involved, and determining the appropriate analogue to 
such a regulation in the Second Amendment context may not be easy. 
46 Subject to a question, discussed below, of what the analogue to having a 
justification unrelated to the suppression of expression is. 
47 Justice Breyer’s dissent disagrees with this formulation of the right, which is 
why he discusses such things as the ability of residents of the District of Columbia to 
engage in neighboring jurisdictions in hunting and gun-related sports such as target-LCB_13_2_ART_5_TUSHNET.DOC  5/14/2009 6:09 PM 
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homeowners with “ample”—or indeed any real—alternative methods of 
exercising that right.
48 I think it worth observing that, were the courts to 
adopt an approach like this one, Heller’s practical effects are likely to be 
quite small. The decision would invalidate complete bans on handgun 
possession in the home and their equivalent, such as permit 
requirements so restrictive as to amount in practice to an effective ban on 
such ownership.
49 
Yet, the analogy between the First and the Second Amendments 
faces one major difficulty. Modern scholarship has shown that the old 
term “time, place, and manner” is misleading. What distinguishes these 
regulations from others is that they are, as quoted above, justified without 
reference to the content of the speech: True, in Kovacs political 
candidates could not use sound trucks, but neither could those 
advertising the availability of ice cream. I find it quite difficult to figure 
out what might be the analogy in the Second Amendment context to the 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations. 
One possibility is that regulations would be “Second Amendment 
neutral” if they are justified by government interests unrelated to a 
person’s ability to use weapons in self-defense at home. This formulation 
runs up against at least two difficulties. First, and less important, it might 
introduce doctrinal redundancy. As I noted earlier, the regulation in 
Heller might be unconstitutional because it did not leave ample 
alternative opportunities for armed self-defense at home. Treating the 
regulation as “Second Amendment neutral” might make it 
unconstitutional at the triggering stage. Second, and more important, I 
find it hard to imagine a regulation that is not justified by interests 
unrelated to the ability to use weapons in self-defense at home. Trigger-
lock and similar safe-storage requirements are justified by the interest in 
avoiding accidental shootings, not in connection with self-defense. 
Indeed, the complete ban on possession of handguns could be, and was 
sought to be, justified by the government interest—in a city with a high 
rate of burglary—in ensuring that law-breakers not have access to 
weapons stolen from the homes of law-abiding citizens. 
More generally, the intuition behind the doctrines dealing with 
content-neutral regulations is that they are not “about” speech, but 
rather are “about” urban amenities like quiet or “about” the streets, and 
only incidentally restrict the dissemination of expression. In contrast, 
 
shooting: These possibilities show to him that the District’s residents have ample 
alternative methods of exercising their right to own handguns. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2861 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
48 Here too the presumptively constitutional ban on gun ownership by felons is 
more troublesome, because, for reasons noted above, it might not be narrowly 
tailored, although deference to legislative judgment might be enough to support the 
conclusion that such a ban is constitutionally permissible. 
49 See also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 
(2007) (describing the doctrinal formulations used by state courts interpreting state 
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gun regulations are “about,” well, guns. If I have provided accurate 
descriptions of the First Amendment intuition and gun regulations, 
almost every gun regulation would be analogous to a content-based 
regulation of expression. And, if that is so, Heller’s compromises might 
well unwind completely. 
Gun-control proponents would like to read Justice Scalia’s 
observation that the regulation in Heller could not survive any level of 
review to mean that it fails intermediate scrutiny. That, though, is not 
what the sentence says. It could just as easily mean that the regulation 
fails strict scrutiny. Here, the compromise lies in avoiding specifying what 
the applicable standard of review is because some in the Heller majority 
thought that the proper standard was intermediate scrutiny and others 
thought that it was strict scrutiny. As I have suggested at several points 
and now make explicit, strict scrutiny is more compatible with the 
methodological approach Justice Scalia explicitly defends, intermediate 
scrutiny with the approach he explicitly criticizes. 
But, of course, even if strict scrutiny is not inevitably fatal,
50 it surely 
is debilitating. That is, regulations rarely survive strict scrutiny. Gun 
regulations would be particularly susceptible to invalidation on the 
ground that they are not narrowly tailored to the interests the 
government seeks to advance by them. The reason is that gun regulations 
typically achieve quite small reductions in virtually everything the 
government might say it was trying to accomplish: At their best they 
produce small reductions in crime, violence, gun violence, accidental 
deaths caused by guns, whatever and—even worse from the viewpoint of 
gun-control proponents seeking to explain why regulations survive strict 
scrutiny—gun regulations typically produce offsetting increases (perhaps 
not fully offsetting, but enough to be worrisome under a strict scrutiny 
approach) in the same metrics of crime, violence, and the like.
51 
So, could safe-storage laws satisfy strict scrutiny? I suspect not, at least 
if the doctrinal test is fairly applied.
52 Safe-storage laws reduce death and 
injury from accidental firings, but they increase death and injury during 
home invasions and assaults. Their net effect may be positive, but might 
not be large enough to satisfy a serious narrow-tailoring requirement. 
What of bans on gun possession in sensitive places? Again, probably not. 
They might deter some unlawful uses of guns in those places—the classic 
mass or courthouse shootings—but they also make it impossible for 
armed bystanders to intervene before more serious harm occurs. Here 
too the regulations might not satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement. 
Note, though, that these just are the regulations Heller’s compromises 
 
50 I allude here to Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is 
not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
51 For an introductory overview of the relevant research, see TUSHNET, supra note 
32, at 75–111. 
52 I insert the qualification to take account of the possibility of a disingenuous 
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said were presumptively constitutional. Under strict scrutiny, the 
presumption might well be overcome with respect to those very 
regulations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Describing some regulations of gun ownership and use as 
presumptively constitutional seems to have been a necessary 
compromise, from Justice Scalia’s point of view. But compromises are 
risky because they provide the opportunity for later decision-makers to 
move in either direction—toward invalidating even some of the 
presumptively constitutional regulations or, importantly, toward 
upholding everything but the regulation struck down in Heller—while 
maintaining that they are acting within the doctrine set out in Heller. As I 
have discussed in more detail elsewhere, gun policy is one of the 
locations where Americans conduct our culture wars.
53 Heller’s meaning 
will be determined by—and in—future battles in those wars. I for one 
would not be amazed to discover the gun-rights revolution turning out 
much like the federalism and takings revolutions, and for the same 
reason: Culture wars produce repeated battles in the courts and symbolic 
victories and defeats there, but permanent victory comes from 
developments elsewhere, which then yield real rather than symbolic 
decisions by the courts. 
 
 
53 TUSHNET, supra note 32. 